Rewind
Phase 2. Blocked on Phase 1 + $420–985K raise.
Rewind is resolution-failure insurance. A policyholder buys protection on a specific PM contract; if that contract fails at resolution — oracle dispute, contract-text ambiguity, observable manipulation — Rewind pays out up to the policy limit.
Why it works
Section titled “Why it works”Resolution risk is inherent
Section titled “Resolution risk is inherent”Cong et al. 2025 formally proves the Oracle Trilemma: no protocol can simultaneously achieve decentralization, aggregate truthfulness, and scalability. This is an impossibility result, not a missing feature.
It is quantified
Section titled “It is quantified”- Adjudication Risk Index (Ma 2026): UMA voting-correctness ranges 0.6353–0.9995 over 747 days with measurable spikes tied to voting-power concentration. When error probability exceeds 1/3, no bond parameter can restore deterrence.
- Semantic Risk Score (Sanjabi 2026): LLM-derived score predicts oracle disputes from contract text alone. Spearman ρ=0.157, p<0.001. Published with replication code. Tau = 0.10 SRS cutoff filters 59% of markets while doubling median volume.
- Historical losses: $403M in oracle manipulation attacks in 2022 alone (Duley). MakerDAO Black Thursday: $8.32M liquidated at zero DAI. Compound malfunction: $89M bad debt. Pyth: 90% BTC/USD misreport.
- Insider trading: $143M anomalous profit on Polymarket (Feb 2024 – Feb 2026) — Ofir & Mitts 2026. Flagged traders 69.9% win rate (p<0.001).
- Enforcement gap: zero CFTC insider-trading cases on event contracts as of 2024 (Ashar 2025). CFTC budget $365M / 700 employees vs SEC $2.1B / 5,000.
It is currently unpriced
Section titled “It is currently unpriced”The market responds to resolution risk with liquidity flight, not risk-adjusted pricing. A 0.1 SRS increase reduces contract volume by ~60% (Sanjabi). Traders flee rather than demanding compensation — an Akerlof lemons dynamic and a classic insurance opportunity.
Precedent exists
Section titled “Precedent exists”Nexus Mutual and Etherisc operate DeFi insurance without derivatives classification. Rewind follows that pattern: infrastructure provider, not speculative instrument.
Pricing (v0, three layers)
Section titled “Pricing (v0, three layers)”premium = actuarial_base(event_type) + semantic_risk_surcharge(SRS) + concentration_surcharge(pool_exposure, correlation) − cs_discount(insured_counterparty)actuarial_base— event-type hazard rate derived from UMA dispute history (Ma/Sanjabi). Starting estimate: 2–3% of notional, matching functionSPACE’s industry estimate of the unpriced risk premium.semantic_risk_surcharge— SRS-derived scalar multiplier. Contracts above SRS τ=0.10 are either refused or surcharged heavily.concentration_surcharge— classical insurance underwriting. Pool exposure concentrated on correlated events triggers surcharges until rebalanced.cs_discount— high-Chrono-Score forecasters correlate empirically with well-specified markets (hypothesis to validate during Phase 1 data collection). Initial discount capped at base × 0.25.
Pool structure
Section titled “Pool structure”- Single pool, USDC-denominated in v0. Simplicity over capital efficiency.
- Whitelisted markets — 10–20 to start, expanded as underwriting data accumulates.
- Target loss ratio: 40%. 60% of premiums to protocol / reserve split.
- Tranching (junior/senior) deferred to v0.2 — Slava’s fund-management experience applies here.
Build status
Section titled “Build status”- Spec: complete (
CONCEPTUAL_MODEL.md §4c) - Team: existing Solidity dev from Phase 1 + quant consultant ($15–25K, part-time)
- Audit: $50–80K (insurance contracts are higher-risk)
- Legal: non-US entity + jurisdiction-specific opinion
- Capital: $200–500K pool seed
- Timeline: 14–20 weeks after Phase 1 has produced Polymarket CTF-integration operational experience
Citations
Section titled “Citations”See resolution risk, ecosystem layers, institutional demand.